In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager’s and the controller’s bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.
Keywords: Game theory, corruption game, Nash equilibrium, Manager–Controller conflict
@article{RO_2022__56_1_165_0,
author = {Belhaiza, Slim and Charrad, Salwa and M{\textquoteright}Hallah, Rym},
title = {On the impact of corruption on managers{\textquoteright} and controllers{\textquoteright} behavior},
journal = {RAIRO. Operations Research},
pages = {165--181},
year = {2022},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {56},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2021191},
mrnumber = {4376292},
zbl = {1483.91017},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021191/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Belhaiza, Slim AU - Charrad, Salwa AU - M’Hallah, Rym TI - On the impact of corruption on managers’ and controllers’ behavior JO - RAIRO. Operations Research PY - 2022 SP - 165 EP - 181 VL - 56 IS - 1 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021191/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2021191 LA - en ID - RO_2022__56_1_165_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Belhaiza, Slim %A Charrad, Salwa %A M’Hallah, Rym %T On the impact of corruption on managers’ and controllers’ behavior %J RAIRO. Operations Research %D 2022 %P 165-181 %V 56 %N 1 %I EDP-Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021191/ %R 10.1051/ro/2021191 %G en %F RO_2022__56_1_165_0
Belhaiza, Slim; Charrad, Salwa; M’Hallah, Rym. On the impact of corruption on managers’ and controllers’ behavior. RAIRO. Operations Research, Tome 56 (2022) no. 1, pp. 165-181. doi: 10.1051/ro/2021191
[1] and , Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: an experiment on mitigating collusive bribery. J. Econ. Behav. Organiz. 133 (2017) 256–272. | DOI
[2] , and , A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibia for extensive form games. Int. Game Theory Rev. 11 (2009) 437–451. | MR | Zbl | DOI
[3] , On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms. Exp. Econ. 19 (2016) 240–267. | DOI
[4] , and , On the performance of managers and controllers: a polymatrix game approach for the manager-controller-board of directors conflict. J. Optim. Theory App. 177 (2018) 584–602. | MR | Zbl | DOI
[5] , A tax evasion – bribery game: experimental evidence from Ukraine. Eur. J. Comp. Econ. 3 (2006) 31–49.
[6] and , Does reporting decrease corruption? J. Interdisciplinary Econ. 26 (2014) 161–186. | DOI
[7] and , Pre-emptive corruption, hold-up and repeated interactions. Economica 79 (2012) 258–283. | DOI
[8] , To bribe or not to bribe. An extension to Lambsdorff and Frank (2007) corruption Game, Working Paper, Passau University, , Germany (2010).
[9] and , Deduction. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey (1991).
[10] , Extensive games and the problem of information. In: Contributions to the Theory of Games II, edited by and . Princeton University Press, Princeton (1953) 193–216. | MR | Zbl
[11] and , Corrupt reciprocity. Experimental evidence on a men’s game. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 31 (2011) 116–125. | DOI
[12] and , Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency. Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research, Workshop on November 16 (2006).
[13] and , Game theory analysis of the bribery behavior. Int. J. Bus. Soc. Sci. 2 (2011) 104–107.
[14] and , Bribery and endogenous monitoring effort: an experimental study., Eastern Econ. J. 38 (2012) 356–380. | DOI
[15] , Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Massachusetts, London-England (1997. | Zbl | MR
[16] , , , , , , , , , and , Intelligence: knowns and unknowns. Am. Psychol. 51 (1996) 77–101. | DOI
[17] , Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors’ moral level. Comput. Math. Model. 25 (2014) 87–102. | MR | Zbl | DOI
[18] , and , An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle blowing. J. Bus. Econ. 88 (2018) 883–914.
[19] , A behavioral model of rational choice. In: Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. Wiley, New York (1957). | MR
[20] , Endogenous detection of collaborative crime: the case of corruption. Rev. Law Econ. 10 (2014) 201–217.
[21] and , Bribe and punishment: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of bribery. PLoS One 10 (2015) e0133441. | DOI
[22] World Bank, Empowering the poor to fight corruption. Online Article http://go.worldbank.org/APAR27YJ50 (2011).
Cité par Sources :
