Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 47 (2013) no. 1, pp. 47-58.

This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.

DOI : 10.1051/ro/2013026
Classification : 91A10, 91A18
Mots clés : basic integer-splitting game, delegation game, delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent chains
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Sorin, Sylvain; Wan, Cheng. Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 47 (2013) no. 1, pp. 47-58. doi : 10.1051/ro/2013026. http://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2013026/

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