This paper considers a retailer-manufacturer dual-channel supply chain (DCSC) consisting of a retail channel and a direct sale channel. Previous literature has shown that either asymmetric reference effect (ARE) or information sharing (IS) significantly impacts customers’ demand, then the channel members’ pricing decisions. As yet, no literature has examined the joint effect of both on the channel members’ pricing decisions, especially in a DCSC. To fill up the deficiency, we first explore and compare the pricing decisions in a centralized and a decentralized DCSC with ARE, respectively, with and without IS, using the Stackelberg game and two-stage optimization technique. Then we evaluate the values of ARE and IS by introducing model misspecification and numerical experiments. We find that substantial revenue will be lost if the retailer ignores ARE when information is shared than not shared, especially when the channel members are pessimistic about the market. A higher reference price or a weaker ARE induces the channel members to increase prices, and make IS more valuable to them. Besides, whether the information is shared or not, channel members generally underestimate revenues under a relatively high reference price, while overestimating the revenues under a relatively small reference price. Furthermore, the manufacturer conditionally accepts the IS while the retailer always accepts it.
Keywords: Supply chain management, asymmetric reference effect, information sharing, dual-channel, Stackelberg game
@article{RO_2022__56_1_445_0,
author = {Zhao, Nenggui and Wang, Qiang and Wu, Jie},
title = {Price decisions with asymmetric reference effect and information sharing in dual-channel supply chains},
journal = {RAIRO. Operations Research},
pages = {445--473},
year = {2022},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {56},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2022018},
mrnumber = {4386476},
zbl = {1484.91206},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2022018/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Zhao, Nenggui AU - Wang, Qiang AU - Wu, Jie TI - Price decisions with asymmetric reference effect and information sharing in dual-channel supply chains JO - RAIRO. Operations Research PY - 2022 SP - 445 EP - 473 VL - 56 IS - 1 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2022018/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2022018 LA - en ID - RO_2022__56_1_445_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Zhao, Nenggui %A Wang, Qiang %A Wu, Jie %T Price decisions with asymmetric reference effect and information sharing in dual-channel supply chains %J RAIRO. Operations Research %D 2022 %P 445-473 %V 56 %N 1 %I EDP-Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2022018/ %R 10.1051/ro/2022018 %G en %F RO_2022__56_1_445_0
Zhao, Nenggui; Wang, Qiang; Wu, Jie. Price decisions with asymmetric reference effect and information sharing in dual-channel supply chains. RAIRO. Operations Research, Tome 56 (2022) no. 1, pp. 445-473. doi: 10.1051/ro/2022018
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