Perishable and short-life products can be seen everywhere in life. Due to the particularity of these products, they are more complicated in supply chain management. This paper studies whether the two-part tariff and ZRS contract can achieve the purpose of reducing risks and coordinating supply chain. We assume that market demand and supplier yield are uncertain, and we use game theory and probability distribution for research. The research results show that when the information is asymmetric, the manufacturer always ignore the demand forecast information provided by the retailer under the wholesale price contract. When the demand is uncertain, regardless of whether the information is symmetric or asymmetric, the two-part tariff contract and the ZRS contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve maximum profit. When the retailer’s degree of risk aversion is high, the ZRS contract is better than the two-part tariff, which can reduce the risk of retailers and achieve the purpose of coordinating the supply chain. When the supply is uncertain, the manufacturer can provide the supplier with a risk-sharing contract, including the return price and the sharing ratio that meet certain constraints. Such a contract can effectively reduce the supplier’s risk and realize supply chain coordination.
Keywords: Risk sharing, supply chain coordination, information asymmetry, uncertainty of yield and demand
@article{RO_2022__56_1_123_0,
author = {Ji, Chunyi and Liu, Xiangxiang},
title = {Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty},
journal = {RAIRO. Operations Research},
pages = {123--143},
year = {2022},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {56},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2021186},
mrnumber = {4376288},
zbl = {1483.90031},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021186/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Ji, Chunyi AU - Liu, Xiangxiang TI - Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty JO - RAIRO. Operations Research PY - 2022 SP - 123 EP - 143 VL - 56 IS - 1 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021186/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2021186 LA - en ID - RO_2022__56_1_123_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Ji, Chunyi %A Liu, Xiangxiang %T Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty %J RAIRO. Operations Research %D 2022 %P 123-143 %V 56 %N 1 %I EDP-Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021186/ %R 10.1051/ro/2021186 %G en %F RO_2022__56_1_123_0
Ji, Chunyi; Liu, Xiangxiang. Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty. RAIRO. Operations Research, Tome 56 (2022) no. 1, pp. 123-143. doi: 10.1051/ro/2021186
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