Governments all over the world usually establish the policy of subsidies to stimulate firms’ technology innovation behaviors. The participating firms may share the high risk of expense through cooperative technology innovation. Different forms of governmental subsidies may have a significant impact on the choice of firms’ cooperative innovation strategies. This paper investigates the effect of government subsidies on firms’ technology innovation strategies. We consider two modes of cooperative technology innovation (technology transfer or joint innovation) in a two-level supply chain including an upstream manufacturer (UM) and a downstream manufacturer (DM) in the presence of two forms of governmental subsidies (a per-unit production subsidy or an innovation subsidy). We find that in the presence of either form of governmental subsidy, technology transfer mode is better off for the UM than joint innovation mode when the UM’s distribution power is greater than a threshold, otherwise joint innovation mode is better off. In the presence of a given form of governmental subsidy, the DM’s response strategy is influenced by the interaction of different values of the proportion of revenue and the fraction of innovation cost. In the presence of a per-unit production subsidy, the social welfare is always more under technology transfer mode than under joint innovation mode, while in the presence of an innovation subsidy, the opposite is true. We also show that under a given cooperative innovation mode, both the UM and DM expect a per-unit production subsidy if the per-unit tax credit is high, and they expect an innovation subsidy if the proportion of governmental subsidy is high. Finally, we discuss the robustness of the theoretical results.
Keywords: Technology innovation, governmental subsidy, technology transfer, joint innovation, supply chain
@article{RO_2022__56_4_2669_0,
author = {Zhou, Xuejun and Liu, Zhibing and Liu, Jie and Ku, Zaiqiang},
title = {The choice of cooperative technology innovation strategies in a supply chain under governmental subsidy},
journal = {RAIRO. Operations Research},
pages = {2669--2700},
year = {2022},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {56},
number = {4},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2022121},
mrnumber = {4469500},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2022121/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Zhou, Xuejun AU - Liu, Zhibing AU - Liu, Jie AU - Ku, Zaiqiang TI - The choice of cooperative technology innovation strategies in a supply chain under governmental subsidy JO - RAIRO. Operations Research PY - 2022 SP - 2669 EP - 2700 VL - 56 IS - 4 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2022121/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2022121 LA - en ID - RO_2022__56_4_2669_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Zhou, Xuejun %A Liu, Zhibing %A Liu, Jie %A Ku, Zaiqiang %T The choice of cooperative technology innovation strategies in a supply chain under governmental subsidy %J RAIRO. Operations Research %D 2022 %P 2669-2700 %V 56 %N 4 %I EDP-Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2022121/ %R 10.1051/ro/2022121 %G en %F RO_2022__56_4_2669_0
Zhou, Xuejun; Liu, Zhibing; Liu, Jie; Ku, Zaiqiang. The choice of cooperative technology innovation strategies in a supply chain under governmental subsidy. RAIRO. Operations Research, Tome 56 (2022) no. 4, pp. 2669-2700. doi: 10.1051/ro/2022121
[1] , Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers. Int. J. Ind. Org. 18 (2000) 1013–1032. | DOI
[2] and , The choice of partners in R&D cooperation: an empirical analysis of Spanish firms. Technovation 28 (2008) 88–100. | DOI
[3] and , An operations perspective on product take-back legislation for e-waste: theory, practice, and research needs. Prod. Oper. Manage. 21 (2012) 407–422. | DOI
[4] , and , Efficient takeback legislation. Prod. Oper. Manage. 18 (2009) 243–258. | DOI
[5] Australian Government, Clean Technology Investment Program. (2013). https://www.business.gov.au/assistance/clean-technology-investment-program.
[6] , and , New product development and early supplier involvement (ESI): the drivers of ESI adoption. Int. J. Technol. Manage. 15 (1998) 49–69. | DOI
[7] and , Welfare gains from foreign direct investment through technology transfer to local suppliers. J. Int. Econ. 74 (2008) 402–421. | DOI
[8] , R&D cooperation and collusion: the case of joint labs. Manchester School 76 (2008) 424–435. | DOI
[9] and , Wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategy in duopoly supply chains with social responsibility. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 1 (2019) 110–125. | DOI
[10] , and , The impact of government subsidy on supply chains’ sustainability innovation. Omega 86 (2019) 42–58. | DOI
[11] , and , The impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidies for green technology adoption. Manage. Sci. 62 (2016) 1235–1258. | DOI
[12] and , Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. Am. Econ. Rev. 78 (1988) 1133–1137.
[13] , Technology transfer, knowledge transfer and knowledge exchange in the historical context of innovation theory and practice. In: The Knowledge Exchange. An Interactive Conference. Lancaster University, United Kingdom (2013).
[14] and , Cooperative R&D under uncertainty with free entry. Int. J. Ind. Org. 28 (2010) 74–85. | DOI
[15] , Draft code of conduct on transfer of technology. World Dev. 2 (1974) 77–82. | DOI
[16] , and , The impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard in R&D project under uncertain environment. Soft Comput. 22 (2018) 5231–5246. | DOI
[17] and , Collaboration in R&D activities: firm-specific decisions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 185 (2008) 864–883. | MR | DOI
[18] , and , Firms’ R&D cooperation behavior in a supply chain. Prod. Oper. Manage. 23 (2014) 599–609. | DOI
[19] and , Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 164 (2015) 319–329. | DOI
[20] Government of Canada, (2017). https://canadabusiness.ca/managing-your-business/day-to-day-operations/environment-and-business/.
[21] , , and , The government’s optimal subsidy scheme under manufacturers’ competition of price and product energy efficiency. Omega 8 (2019) 70–101. | DOI
[22] and , Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 286 (2020) 726–739. | MR | DOI
[23] , and , Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. Am. Econ. Rev. 82 (1992) 1293–1306.
[24] , and , Gaining from vertical partnerships: knowledge transfer, relationship duration, and supplier performance improvement in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries. Strategic Manage. J. 24 (2003) 293–316. | DOI
[25] , and , Environmental taxes and the choice of green technology. Prod. Oper. Manage. 22 (2013) 1035–1055. | DOI
[26] and , A retrospective look at production and operations management articles on new product development. Prod. Oper. Manage. 14 (2005) 433–441. | DOI
[27] and , Product development decisions: A review of the literature. Manage. Sci. 47 (2001) 1–21. | DOI
[28] , and , Price and carbon emission reduction decisions and revenue-sharing contract considering fairness concerns. J. Cleaner Prod. 190 (2018) 303–314. | DOI
[29] , , and , Green loan and subsidy for promoting clean production innovation. J. Cleaner Prod. 187 (2018) 421–431. | DOI
[30] , , and , The choice of the government green subsidy scheme: innovation subsidy vs. product subsidy. Int. J. Prod. Res. 58 (2020) 4932–4946. | DOI
[31] , , and , Corporate social responsibility and decision analysis in a supply chain through government subsidy. J. Cleaner Prod. 208 (2019) 436–447. | DOI
[32] , , and , Revelation for green product operation strategy of a retailer under different reliability levels of servicing the market. Comput. Ind. Eng. 160 (2021) 107594. | DOI
[33] , , and , Supply chain green innovation subsidy strategy considering consumer heterogeneity. J. Cleaner Prod. 281 (2021) 125199. | DOI
[34] , and , Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 216 (2012) 293–300. | DOI
[35] and , Coordinating pricing and supply of public interest goods using rebates and subsidies. IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage. 62 (2015) 65–79. | DOI
[36] and , The impact of scientific and commercial values on the sources of scientific instrument innovation. Res. Policy 23 (1994) 459–469. | DOI
[37] and , The role of equity, royalty, and fixed fees in technology licensing to university spin-offs. Manage. Sci. 61 (2014) 1323–1343. | DOI
[38] , Market structure and R&D investment spillovers. Econ. Modell. 43 (2014) 321–329. | DOI
[39] , and , Technology transfer in the supply chain oriented to industry 4.0: a literature review. Technol. Anal. Strategic Manage. 31 (2019) 546–562. | DOI
[40] , Meet the IIT Madras graduate who has built India’s first solar boat ferry. (2016). Retrieved from http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-meet-the-iit-madras-graduate-who-has-built-india-s-first-solar-boatferry-2167266.
[41] and , R&D with spillovers: monopoly versus noncooperative and cooperative duopoly. Manchester School 79 (2011) 125–144. | DOI
[42] , Transfer of technological knowledge: a multiple case study in the pharmaceutical industry. Gestao Producao 12 (2005) 255–269.
[43] , , and , Green insurance subsidy for promoting clean production innovation. J. Cleaner Prod. 148 (2017) 111–117. | DOI
[44] and , Improving interaction mechanism of carbon reduction technology innovation between supply chain enterprises and government by means of differential game. J. Cleaner Prod. 296 (2021) 126578. | DOI
[45] and , The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance. Manage. Sci. 58 (2012) 2251–2271. | DOI
[46] , , and , Strategic technology licensing in a supply chain. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 267 (2018) 162–175. | MR | DOI
[47] , and , Impacts of knowledge spillovers and cartelization on cooperative innovation decisions with uncertain technology efficiency. Comput. Ind. Eng. 143 (2020). | DOI
[48] , The limits of mass customization. Sloan Manage. Rev. 42 (2001) 81–87.
Cité par Sources :
