In order to improve the recovery rate of waste products and maximize the social welfare, this paper investigates the problem of government setting a recovery rate threshold for the recycler in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with the information asymmetry. By establishing the government incentive regulation model, the government can disclose the true recovery cost of the recycler and guide the recycler to make an reasonable effort. In this study, our model obtains the best recovery rate threshold for the recycler from the perspective of maximizing social welfare. Then, we conduct some sensitivity analyses and explore the impacts of related factors on the strategies-making of government and supply chain players. The results of the study indicates that the recovery rate threshold set not only depends on the operation efficiency of the recycler, it also affected by the consumers behavior and the production efficiency of manufacturer. The government should not pursue a high recovery rate blindly, more attention should be paid to control the cost of effort made by the recycler. With the increasing of the negative utility for the recycler to make effort, the government will improve the recovery threshold, otherwise, the threshold will decrease. The results facilitate scientific incentive mechanism development, and provide a reference for promoting CLSC operations.
@article{RO_2021__55_3_1675_0,
author = {Wu, Qunli and Xu, Xinxin},
title = {To be raised up or kicked out? {Insights} for the recycler in closed-loop supply chain with the regulation of government},
journal = {RAIRO. Operations Research},
pages = {1675--1694},
year = {2021},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {55},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2021066},
mrnumber = {4273678},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021066/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Wu, Qunli AU - Xu, Xinxin TI - To be raised up or kicked out? Insights for the recycler in closed-loop supply chain with the regulation of government JO - RAIRO. Operations Research PY - 2021 SP - 1675 EP - 1694 VL - 55 IS - 3 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021066/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2021066 LA - en ID - RO_2021__55_3_1675_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Wu, Qunli %A Xu, Xinxin %T To be raised up or kicked out? Insights for the recycler in closed-loop supply chain with the regulation of government %J RAIRO. Operations Research %D 2021 %P 1675-1694 %V 55 %N 3 %I EDP-Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021066/ %R 10.1051/ro/2021066 %G en %F RO_2021__55_3_1675_0
Wu, Qunli; Xu, Xinxin. To be raised up or kicked out? Insights for the recycler in closed-loop supply chain with the regulation of government. RAIRO. Operations Research, Tome 55 (2021) no. 3, pp. 1675-1694. doi: 10.1051/ro/2021066
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