One of the main ways of economic development is technological innovation development. The support provided by the government and the policies adopted for technology developments are important issues in the context of technology and innovation policymaking. On the other hand, the structural issues in some countries, especially in Iran, as well as the conflict of interests and ethical problems, are of crucial importance in large-scale technology development projects. The present paper addresses governmental policies and support and the underpinning parameters given the points mentioned about the economic and technological development of Iran. In this study, we first interviewed some experts, and the results were employed as inputs of the quantitative model. The important parameters influencing the determination of governmental support and policy type were also addressed. The long-term behavior of the public and private sectors as two key players were analyzed by the evolutionary game theory and their strategies were solved by replicative dynamic equations. Finally, a numerical study was conducted for a real case in Iran to better understand the features of the game model in real conditions. The results of the case study show that the main approach of the government should be legal monitoring although the minimum incentive policies and supports should also be in place. The sensitivity analysis of some major parameters reveals that the main factor in project implementation is to consider the income and costs of the private sector. The governmental policy should be based on preparing incentive mechanisms at an appropriate level and then precise legal monitoring, which will lead to technology development with the cooperation of the parties, minimum ethical problems, and the minimization of the impact of structural problems, including sanctions.
@article{RO_2021__55_2_1153_0,
author = {Bagheri Nasrabadi, Mahdi and Jassbi, Abdullah and Bonyadi Naeini, Ali and Shavvalpour, Saeid},
title = {Optimal government support policy towards technology development considering the challenges of conflict of interests, ethical and structural problems},
journal = {RAIRO. Operations Research},
pages = {1153--1169},
year = {2021},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {55},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2021023},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021023/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Bagheri Nasrabadi, Mahdi AU - Jassbi, Abdullah AU - Bonyadi Naeini, Ali AU - Shavvalpour, Saeid TI - Optimal government support policy towards technology development considering the challenges of conflict of interests, ethical and structural problems JO - RAIRO. Operations Research PY - 2021 SP - 1153 EP - 1169 VL - 55 IS - 2 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021023/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2021023 LA - en ID - RO_2021__55_2_1153_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Bagheri Nasrabadi, Mahdi %A Jassbi, Abdullah %A Bonyadi Naeini, Ali %A Shavvalpour, Saeid %T Optimal government support policy towards technology development considering the challenges of conflict of interests, ethical and structural problems %J RAIRO. Operations Research %D 2021 %P 1153-1169 %V 55 %N 2 %I EDP-Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2021023/ %R 10.1051/ro/2021023 %G en %F RO_2021__55_2_1153_0
Bagheri Nasrabadi, Mahdi; Jassbi, Abdullah; Bonyadi Naeini, Ali; Shavvalpour, Saeid. Optimal government support policy towards technology development considering the challenges of conflict of interests, ethical and structural problems. RAIRO. Operations Research, Tome 55 (2021) no. 2, pp. 1153-1169. doi: 10.1051/ro/2021023
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