In this paper, we propose a variation of weak covariance named as non-singleton covariance, requiring that changing the worth of a non-singleton coalition in a TU game affects the payoffs of all players equally. We establish that this covariance is characteristic for the convex combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value, together with efficiency and a one-parameterized axiom treating a particular kind of players specially. As special cases, parallel axiomatizations of the two values are also provided.
Keywords: TU game, equal division value, equal surplus division value, nullifying player, dummifying player
Hu, Xun-Feng 1 ; Li, Deng-Feng 1
@article{RO_2018__52_3_935_0,
author = {Hu, Xun-Feng and Li, Deng-Feng},
title = {A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for {TU} games},
journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Op\'erationnelle},
pages = {935--942},
year = {2018},
publisher = {EDP Sciences},
volume = {52},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1051/ro/2017024},
zbl = {1419.91044},
mrnumber = {3885517},
language = {en},
url = {https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2017024/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Hu, Xun-Feng AU - Li, Deng-Feng TI - A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games JO - RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle PY - 2018 SP - 935 EP - 942 VL - 52 IS - 3 PB - EDP Sciences UR - https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2017024/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2017024 LA - en ID - RO_2018__52_3_935_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Hu, Xun-Feng %A Li, Deng-Feng %T A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games %J RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle %D 2018 %P 935-942 %V 52 %N 3 %I EDP Sciences %U https://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2017024/ %R 10.1051/ro/2017024 %G en %F RO_2018__52_3_935_0
Hu, Xun-Feng; Li, Deng-Feng. A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 52 (2018) no. 3, pp. 935-942. doi: 10.1051/ro/2017024
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