Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !
Philosophia Scientiae, Volume 6 (2002) no. 2, p. 109-125

In this paper, I insist on two limits of the principle of charity. 1) The principle is supposed to help us solve the problem of the observational under-determination of our attributions of beliefs and desires. But it fails on that ground. The principle rules out attributions of beliefs and desires that are incompatible with the principle, but it cannot help us decide between incompatible attributions of beliefs and desires that are compatible with the principle; 2) Strong versions of the principle rule out the possibility of motivated irrationality. If one believes in the possibility of motivated irrationality, one cannot reasonably endorse strong versions of the principle of charity.

@article{PHSC_2002__6_2_109_0,
     author = {Ogien, Ruwen},
     title = {Soyons charitables, mais pas trop~!},
     journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
     publisher = {\'Editions Kim\'e},
     volume = {6},
     number = {2},
     year = {2002},
     pages = {109-125},
     language = {fr},
     url = {http://www.numdam.org/item/PHSC_2002__6_2_109_0}
}
Ogien, Ruwen. Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !. Philosophia Scientiae, Volume 6 (2002) no. 2, pp. 109-125. http://www.numdam.org/item/PHSC_2002__6_2_109_0/

[1] Bach, Kent 1981.- An Analysis of Self-deception, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41, 1981 : 351-370.

[2] Boudon, Raymond 1995.- Le Juste et le vrai, Paris : Fayard.

[3] Cohen, L. Jonathan 1995.- An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Oxford : Clarendon Press.

[4] Davidson, Donald 1970.- How is Weakness of the Will Possible ?, in Joel Feinberg (éd.), Moral Concepts, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1970 ; 93-113. Cité d'après la traduction française de Pascal Engel : Comment la faiblesse de la volonté est-elle possible ?, in Actions et événements, Paris : PUF, 1993 ; 37-65. | MR 409097

[5] Davidson, Donald 1982.- Paradoxes of Irrationality, in Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins (éds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1982 ; 289-305. Cité d'après la traduction française par Pascal Engel : Paradoxes de l'irrationalité, [Davidson 1991] ; 21-43.

[6] Davidson, Donald 1982.- Rational Animals, Dialectica, 36 : 318-327. Cité d'après la traduction française par Pascal Engel : Animaux rationnels, in [Davidson 1991] ; 63-75.

[7] Davidson, Donald 1985.- Deception and Division, in Ernest Le Pore & Brian McLaughlin (éds.), Actions and Events. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford : Blackwell, 1985 ; 138-148. Cité d'après la traduction française par Pascal Engel : Duperie et division, in [Davidson 1991] ; 45-61.

[8] Davidson, Donald 1991.- Paradoxes de l'irrationalité, traduction française par Pascal Engel de trois articles de D. Davidson, Combas : L'éclat, 1991.

[9] Delpla, Isabelle 2001.- Quine, Davidson. Le principe de charité, Paris : PUF, 2001.

[10] Dennett, Daniel 1987.- The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Massahusetts : M.I.T. Press, 1987. Cité d'après la traduction de Pascal Engel : La Stratégie de l'interprète, Paris : Gallimard, 1990. | MR 1114148

[11] Elster, John 1984.- Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

[12] Elster, John 1986a.- Introduction, in J. Elster (éd.), The Multiple Self, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

[13] Elster, John 1986b.- Deception and Self-deception in Stendhal, in J. Elster (éd.), The Multiple Self, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 93-113.

[14] Engel, Pascal 1991.- Interpretation without Hermeneutics. A Plea Against Ecumenism” ? Topoï, 10, 1991, 137-146.

[15] Nisbett, R. & Ross, L. 1980.- Human Inference, Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice Hall.

[16] Ogien, Ruwen 1995.- Les Causes et les raisons, Nîmes : J. Chambon.

[17] Ogien, Ruwen 2001.- Philosophie des sciences sociales, in Jean-Michel Berthelot (éd.), Épistémologie des sciences sociales, Paris : PUF. Pears, David.

[18] Ogien, Ruwen 1982.- Motivated Irrationality, Freudian Theory and Cognitive Dissonance, in R. Wollheim et J. Hopkins (éds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 264-288.

[19] Ogien, Ruwen 1984.- Motivated Irrationality, Oxford : Clarendon Press.

[20] Ogien, Ruwen 1986.- The Goals and Strategies of Self-Deception, in J. Elster (éd.), The Multiple Self, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 59-77.

[21] Quine, W.V.O. 1960.- Word and Object, Cambridge, Massahusetts : M.I.T. Press. Cité d'après la traduction de Paul Gochet : Le Mot et la chose, Paris : Flammarion, 1977. | MR 111674

[22] Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg 1988.- Mind in Action : Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Boston : Beacon Press.

[23] Stein, Edward 1996.- Without Good Reason, Oxford : Clarendon Press.